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On a measure of skill for games with chance
elements1
Peter Borm2 and Ben van der Genugten2
Abstract
In various countries, including the Netherlands and Austria, legislation is such1
that the question whether a specic game should be considered as a game of chance2
or as a game of skill is predominant in the exploitation decision of private casinos.
This paper aims for an objective and operational criterium to quantify the level of
skill of casino games in order to establish a mutual ranking. The varions concepts
are illustrated by means of variations of Poker.
Keywords: games, skill, chance elements, learnminimax strategy, Poker
1This research is sponsored by Novomatic Holland BV, Nieuwegein. We acknowledge comments and
advise from Stef Tijs and Hans Moors of Tilburg University and Peter Zanoni of the Concord Card
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The commercial exploitation of games with chance elements is a lucrative aair from
the point of view of the propietor. In the Netherlands the exploitation of such games is
controlled by means of legislation as reected in the law "Wet op de Kansspelen (WKS)":
a) .... it is not allowed to: exploit games with monetary prizes if the participants
in general do not have a dominant inuence on the probability to win, unless in
compliance to this act, a license is granted ...
In practice, the gouvernment only grants such a license to the Holland Casino's founda-
tion. In more countries (e.g. Austria) a similar type of legislation is operative and the
questions we address below therefore will arise in some way in other countries than the
Netherlands as well.
So, though our analysis will be focussed primarily on the Dutch situation, practical
applications certainly will reach further than that. Moreover, from a theoretical point
of view, our analysis will oer a general method to measure skill in a broad class of games.
In the remainder we call a game that is covered by the WKS a game of chance. A
game which is not a game of chance will be called a game of skill. So, in particular, to
commercialize games of skill no license within the meaning of the WKS is needed. This
opens the way for private casinos to compete with the games of chance that are exploited
in the Holland Casino's.
Of course the propietor of a game and the legislator can have dierent views on how to
qualify a game since such a judgement about the role of chance is rather subjective and
the nancial stakes are high. If it would be possible to rank a broad class of games with
chance elements by means of an operational and objective criterium which quanties the
level of skill, e.g. on a scale from zero to one, the legislator would be able to decide on a
certain bound on the level of skill, below which a game should be considered as a game
of chance. In this article we propose a specic denition to measure skill and provide
approximations for various casino games. The analysis is partly based on the results
in van der Genugten and Borm (1991, 1994). The various concepts will be illustrated
in some detail by means of simple variations of the game of Poker. Some general ref-
erences on specic (computational) aspects on Poker are Epstein (1977), Scarne (1990)
and Tamburin (1993).
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The paper is organized in the following way.
Section 2 discusses the qualitative requirements we think should be satised by a suitable
measure of skill based on the existing Dutch jurisprudence.
Then, in Section 3, we propose a denition of the level of skill for so-called "basic" games
with a relatively simple structure. This structure enables us to highlight the essential
features of the denition. Since basic games hardly occur in reality this section is of a
didactic nature. In the subsequent sections the denition of the level of skill is generalized
to more sophisticated games . The generalization for one-person games like Roulette,
Blackjack and Golden Ten is discussed in section 4, for two-person zero-sum games like
Chess, Schnapsen and two-person Poker in section 5, and, nally, for general n-person
zero-sum games in section 6.
At this stage some general remarks about the dierences in complexity between the
various classes of games should be made. Casino games typically can be classied as
zero-sum games: apart from possible admission fees money is reallocated among the
participants (including the casino). Further, in a one-person game like Roulette each
player's betting strategy is all-decisive upon the possible expected gains: these gains do
not depend on the behaviour of other players. In a more-person game like Poker it is
typically the case that a player's gains also depend on the opponents' behaviour. So, in
particular, strategic aspects come in. For three- or more-person games also the feature of
possible cooperation between subgroups of players should be taken into account. These
aspects will be considered in detail in the various sections.
A numerical two-person variation of Poker will used to illustrate the underlying concepts
in section 5, a three-person variation in section 6. With respect to the computational
aspects concerning optimal strategies, we will make use of a modication of the learning-
procedure as initially proposed by Brown (1949) and Robinson (1950) (cf. Shapiro (1958)
and Karlin (1959)). This modication is discussed to some extent in section 5. Section
7 concludes with a discussion of implications of our measure of skill together with some
ideas on future research.
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2 Some qualitative criteria for skill
In our analysis we will restrict attention to games which, in principle, can be repeated
under the same conditions. This assumption guarantees an objective quantication of
uncertainty in terms of probability. This does not mean that such a quantication is
impossible beforehand for games of a dierent kind but that it necessarily will be of a
more subjective nature.
We formulate three requirements which in our opinion summarize the basic ideas un-
derlying the Dutch legislation concerning the exploitation of games with chance elements.
R1. The WKS applies exclusively to situations which involve the exploitation of games
with monetary prizes. For this reason we only consider games in which the "game-
result" of a player can be expressed in some way in terms of a certain gain (or loss)
of money.
R2. The skill of a player should be measured as his gain in the long run, i.e. in terms
of expected gains. Necessary for a game of skill is that these expected gains vary
among players.
R3. The fact that there is a dierence between players with respect to their expected
gains, does not immediately imply that the underlying game is a game of skill.
Sucient for a game of skill is that the chance elements involved do no prohibit
these dierences to be substantial.
In van der Genugten and Borm (1994, 1996) each of these requirements is discussed in
detail in the light of the Dutch jurisprudence on specic games as Saturne, Blackjack,
Roulette and Golden Ten. Implicitly these cases make clear that one should distinguish
between three types of players:
(1) a beginner who plays the game in the naive way of somebody who has just mastered
the rules of the game.
(2) an average player who can be thought to represent the vast majority of players.
(3) an advanced player who uses skill at the highest possible level and who sets an
example for other players.
One may conclude that the WKS is concerned with the dierence between a beginner
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and an average player. Therefore, we call the means of the dierence in expected mone-
tary gains (R1) between those two types of players (R2) the learning eect. This eect
should be judged substantial in relation with the restrictive possibilities within the game
set by the chance elements (R3) (e.g. with restrictions on the occurrence of maximal
gains). In this judgement the advanced player has no direct role.
The aim of this paper is to dene, for games within a broad class, the level of skill
as a number S in the interval [0,1]. This number describes to which amount possible
dierences in expected gains between players are restricted by the chance elements within
the game.
A pure game of chance will be game for which S equals 0, a pure game of skill a game
with S equal to 1.
A qualication of a specic game as a game of chance or as a game of skill in the context
of the WKS, will then depend on the bound the legislator sets within the interval [0,1],
below which a game should be classied as a game of chance.
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3 Basic games
In a basic game all participants face the same opponent which is called the bank. There
is no strategic interaction between the players and the bank follows a predescribed and
xed strategy. Moreover, for each player the outcome of a basic game is one of the fol-
lowing two: either losing the stake-money or gaining a xed multiple of the stake-money.
According to the qualitative discussion of section 2 the following data should be sucient
to decide about the level of skill of a basic game:
p0 : the probability that a beginner wins
pa : the probability that an average player wins
Wl : gains in case of a loss (i.e. minus the stake-money)
Wu : gains in case of a win (a multiple of the stake-money)
The dierence pa   p0 provides information about the dierence in skill between a be-
ginner and an average player but does not reect the consequences w.r.t. the monetary
results as required by R2. Therefore we will take the average gains W0 and Wa of a
beginner and an average player, respectively, as a base for our analysis. Here, for a basic
game,
W0 := (1  p0)Wl + p0Wu (3.1)
and
Wa := (1  pa)Wl + paWu: (3.2)
Clearly,
Wl W0  Wa  Wu: (3.3)
A relative measure for the dierence in skill can be obtained by dividing the dierence
Wa  W0 by Wa  Wl which measures the dierence in skill between an average player
and a ctitious worst3 player who, in a basic game, would always succeed in losing the
stake-money. This leads to the quotient






This quotient satises the requirements R1 and R2, but it does not express the restrictive
role of the chance elements as required by R3.
For this reason we will compare Qa with a similar quotient Qu in which the role of the






In particular, due to the restrictive role of the chance elements an average player can
only realize Wa in stead of Wu. Hence, a comparison between the relative measures Qa
and Qu for the dierence in skill w.r.t. a beginner does also justice to the requirement





In theory, expression (3.6) provides a method to rank basic games with respect to skill.
This formula registers in a strictly dened way how the learning eect (R2) is restricted
(R3) by the chance elements present in the game (roughly speaking: in comparison to
maximal gains and maximal losses). The choice for the expression given in (3.6) may
seem rather arbitrary but this is not quite true since a denition of the level of skill has
to full several logical requirements. Some of these requirements are loosely formulated
below.
* A level of skill should not be dependent on the unity of money (e.g. dollars or
pounds) in which gains and losses are expressed.
* In comparing two games with about the same maximal gains/losses, the game with
the higher learning eect should get the higher level of skill.
* In comparing two games with about the same learning eect, the game with the
higher maximal gains/losses should get the lower level of skill.
* A small change in the rules of the game should result in only a small change in the
level of skill.
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The formula given in (3.6) will not be the only one satisfying the requirements above
and, possibly, a modication will be necessary if one asks for additional requirements.
This, however, does not constitute a problem regarding the purpose for which this for-
mula was developed.
In practice, however, diculties will arise in determining W0 and Wa since this requires
specic assumptions on the behaviour of a beginner and an average player. Perhaps the
less dicult problem of the two is how to characterize of a beginner. For example, in
games with a structure like Roulette, choosing a purely random outcome seems a rather
natural line of play for a beginner. Further, for games which are exploited in practice
one can gain insight in how beginners behave just by means of observation. Moreover,
a skilled analysis of the rules of the game might help from a normative point of view.
In any case, for basic games, an exact specication of p0 is not that important since
the impact on the level of skill of a small change in p0 is rather small. A more exact
specication of pa, however, is desirable.
How to determine the behaviour of an average player? A statistical approximation of
pa will be dicult to nd since a precise denition of the population of average players is
dicult to provide. Any particular choice of denition will be necessarily subjective and,
further, practical implementation will be time-consuming and therefore costly. Moreover,
for games which are not exploited (yet) a statistical approach is impossible.
To solve this problem we choose a relatively simple and pragmatic approach. It is a
fact that (for nite zero-sum games) the expected gains of an optimal, i.e. most advanced,
player are fully determined by the rules and structure of the game. So, in particular,
these gains can be measured in an objective way.
Replacing the gains Wa of an average player by the gains Wm of an optimal player in
expression(3.4) and subsequently also in (3.6) one obtains an objective and, in principle,
operational criterium to determine the level of skill of a basic game.
More specically, for a basic game, we dene pm as the probability that an optimal
player wins and
Wm := (1   pm)Wl + pmWu (3.7)
as the average gain of an optimal player.
Clearly it holds that
9












as the level of skill of the underlying game.
Note that S is well-dened if the game is such that
Wl < Wm and W0 < Wu (3.11)
which is an assumption only violated by trivial non-interesting games.
Since W W0
W Wl
is increasing in W we have that S 2[0,1] and also that S  Sa. This means
that in going from Sa to S there is an upward shift in the level of skill. Since this is the
case for each game separately, one may expect that replacing Wa by Wm will have little
eect on the mutual ranking of games w.r.t. the level of skill. However, one should take
this upward shift into account when determining an absolute bound on the level of skill
below which a game should be considered as a game of chance.
Let us now consider the two extreme cases for the level of skill S. The case S = 0
boils down to W0 = Wm or, equivalently, to p0 = pm. This means that the probability
of winning is the same for a beginner and a most advanced player. Consequently, the
players can not exercise any inuence on their chances. For this reason a basic game
with S = 0 is called a pure game of chance. Analogously, a basic game with S = 1 is
called a pure game of skill since this is equivalent to Wm = Wu or, to pm = 1. This
means that the chance mechanism has no eect in the sense that an optimal player can
always win.
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As a numerical illustration we consider the following example.
Example 3.1
Consider the two basic games determined by the following data






For game I the probabilities of winning are low but the relative gains of winning (18
times the stake-money) are high. For game II in some sense the opposite holds: the
probabilities of winning are high but the relative gains are low.
Our analysis w.r.t. skill leads to results of table 3.2.









So, in spite of the seemingly dierent structure of the two games, game I and II have
about the same level of skill if one expresses the qualitative requirements (R1), (R2) and
(R3) in a formal way.
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4 One-person games
In this section we extend the denition of the level of skill from basic games towards
one-person games like Roulette and Blackjack. In fact, basic games form a subclass of
the one-person games: the bank follows a xed and predescribed strategy and there is no
interaction with the other participants in the game. However, basic games are restric-
tive in the sense that they allow only two outcomes: losing the stake-money or gaining
a multiple of it.
In practice, even for relatively simple casino games, a player (or team) has to choose
between various actions, possibly all with dierent monetary implications. For this rea-
son the analysis of one-person games can not be based on the probabilities of winning
for a beginner and an optimal player and on the gains in case of a loss and win, simply
because these concepts can not be dened in an unambiguous way.
Instead we will start out directly from the following four notions of expected gains:
Wl : expected gains of a ctitious worst player
W0 : expected gains of a beginner
Wm : expected gains of an optimal player
Wu : expected gains of a ctitious best player
Here, a ctitious worst (best) player must be thought of as a player who gets to know
the outcome of the chance elements before actually playing and tries to lose (gain) as
much as possible.
Due to the rules of a basic game a ctitious worst (best) player will always succeed in
losing (winning) and thus the notions of Wl and Wu indeed generalize the corresponding
notions for basic games.
The expected gains W0 and Wm are fully determined by a description of the strategy of
a beginner and an optimal player, respectively.
For one-person games with
Wl < Wm and W0 < Wu (4.1)














We also adopt the same terminology: a one-person game with S = 0 is called a pure
game of chance, with S = 1 a pure game of skill.
Example 4.1 (American Roulette)
In American Roulette a player can choose between a great variety of actions. The main
choice however is between "simple" (e.g. rouge/noir, pair/impair) or not (e.g. plein,
cheval, carre). For precise details also on the calculations below, we refer to van der
Genugten and Borm (1994).
Suppose one chooses not to play "simple". Then, no matter what the precise action is,
one's expected gains are   1
37
, if we normalize the stake-money to 1.
Now suppose one chooses to play "simple". Then the winning outcomes never include
"0", but if the outcome of a game is "0", one gets half of the state-money back. This
leads to the expected gains of   1
74
.
Consequently, an optimal player will choose "simple". Hence,Wl =  1 (a ctitious worst
player will always succeed in losing the stake-money), Wu = 35 (knowing the outcome a




What about W0? One can discuss on the behaviour of a beginner in American Roulette.
If one assumes that a beginner chooses to play simple, then W0 =  
1
74
and S = 0.




By substitution it follows that















We may conclude that American Roulette approximately is a pure game of chance.
Example 4.2 (Blackjack)
Blackjack as played in the Holland Casino's is extensively studied in van der Genugten
(1993). Using the technique of simulation the following numbers were derived for the
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The value of W0 corresponds to the strategy "mimic the dealer". The values of Wl and
W
u
reect the fact that the rules of the game are such that even if one knows the out-
come of the chance mechanism i.e. one knows the precise order of the cards, one can not
always succeed in winning or losing.
By substitution we nd that the level of skill for Blackjack equals 0.16.
The Supreme Court in the Netherlands has explicitly qualied Blackjack as a game of
chance. Hence, if one uses the above measure for the notion of skill, a consistency argu-
ment implies that each game with a level of skill below 0.16 should be considered as a
game of chance w.r.t. Dutch legislation.
Example 4.3 (Golden Ten)
By means of a statistical analysis of data concerning the results of actual players (for
details we refer to van der Genugten and Borm (1991)) it can be concluded that the level
of skill for Golden Ten is somewhere between 0.20 and 0.30 depending on specic rules
of the game.
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5 Two-person zero-sum games
In a two-person game it is typically the case that the expected gains of a player depend
not only on his own strategy choice but also on the strategy choice of the other player.
In this section we will consider strictly competitive games in the sense that the gains of
one player equal the losses of the other in each instance of the game. Put dierently, the
players exchange an amount of money specied by the outcome corresponding to one
specic strategy-combination. This type of game is called a zero-sum game because the
total gains of the players equal zero. For example, a Poker game as Seven Card Stud
typically can be classied as a zero-sum game: apart from an admission fee, money is
reallocated among the participants.
To study skill in games we will use an objective analysis of strategic behaviour (such
as braging) based on the assumption of rational players. This approach follows the lines
set out by game theory : a mathematical theory of conict situations which started out
from the pioneering work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and led quite recently
the Nobel prize for economics for Nash, Harsanyi and Selten in 1994.
Consider an arbitrary two-person zero-sum game in which both player 1 and player 2
can choose from a nite number of actions. In this game we will allow a player to choose
a mixed strategy, which provides a probability distribution on the set of actions.
Then this game has a uniquely determined (minimax-) value V in the sense that player 1
can choose a mixed strategy which guarantees him an expected payo of at least V (in-
dependent of player 2's strategy choice), and player 2 has a mixed strategy which keeps
his losses down to at most V . The strategies concerned are called minimax strategies
and can be interpreted as describing optimal play.
Due to these facts we are able to extend the denition of the level of skill to an arbitrary
(nite) zero-sum game with two players 1 and 2.
Assume we are in the role of player 1. If we x a specic minimaxstrategy of player 2
in the sense that we assume that player 2 will act accordingly, the original two-person
game can be reduced to a one-person game because player 1 faces a xed but probabilistic




(1)  W0(1) Wm(1) Wu(1): (5.1)
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Note that, by denition, W
m
(1) equals the value of the game.
Analogously, in the role of player 2, we assume a specic minimax strategy of player 1 to
be given, which reduces the situation to a one-person game. This leads to the following
notions of expected gains w.r.t. player 2:
W
l
(2)  W0(2) Wm(2) Wu(2); (5.2)
where Wm(2) equals minus the value of the game.
To dene the overall notion of skill in the game it is reasonable to average between the
role of player 1 and player 2, implicitly assuming a player of the game to take both the
































W0  Wm Wu: (5.4)







































as the level of skill.









(2). Accordingly, we can adopt the same terminology
as before. A two-person zero-sum game with S = 0 is called a pure game of chance,
while a game with S = 1 is refered to as a pure game of skill.
One nal remark concerning the denition of the level of skill for two-person games is
that it indeed generalizes the denition for one-person games.
Consider a one-person game with player 1 as its only participant who receives or pays
money from or to a bankholder. This game can be viewed as a two-person zero-sum game
in which the role of player 2 is taken by the bankholder. By denition of a one-person
game, player 2 has no freedom in his choice of action and follows a predescribed strategy.
Hence, Wl(1);W0(1);Wm(1) and Wu(1) equal the corresponding one-person notions in-





















In the two-person framework we also have to analyze the role of player 2. However, for
this analysis we assumed optimal behaviour of player 1 and since player 2 has no freedom
of strategy choice it follows that
W
l



















and by substitution it follows that the level of skill S for the two-person game as dened
by (5.8) equals S(1).
Example 5.1 (Two-person Mini Poker)
Two-person Mini Poker is a game of cards played by two players, named player 1 and
player 2, and with three cards of which only the numeric value is important. These
values are 10, 20 and 30, respectively.
Before playing both players donate $ 1 to the stakes. After (re)shuing the deck of cards
each player is dealt one card. Each player knows (the value of) his own card but not
the card of this opponent. Thus, the one card which remains in the deck is not shown
to either of the players.
Player 1 starts the play and has to decide between "checking" or "raising". If he decides
to check, player 2 has to check too and "showdown" follows. If player 1 decides to raise,
he has to add one extra dollar to the stakes. Subsequently, player 2 has to decide between
"folding" or "calling". If the decides to fold, player 1 gets the stakes. If player 2 decides
to raise, he also has to add one extra dollar to the stakes and "showdown" follows. If the
players have decided upon "showdown" both cards are compared and the player with
the highest card value gets the stakes.
In this simple game of Poker both chance (dealing cards) and skill (w.r.t. a good betting
strategy) play a role. We will reach the conclusion that the level of skill S equals about
0.28.
First we will describe the possible strategies of both players. For each of the three pos-
sible cards, both player 1 and player 2 have to choose between two possible actions,
leading to a total of 8 combinations. The so-called pure strategies are represented in
table 5.1 and table 5.2.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10: C C C C R R R R
20: C C R R C C R R
30: C R C R C R C R
Table 5.1: Pure strategies of player 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10: F F F F C C C C
20: F F C C F F C C
30: F C F C F C F C
Table 5.2: Pure strategies of player 2.
For example, the strategy 4 of player 1 should be interpreted as
"Check with 10, Raise with 20, Raise with 30",
and strategy 6 of player 2 as
"Call with 10, Fold with 20, Call with 30",
if you are called upon to act.
Allowing for mixed strategies, each player may put a probability measure on his set of







of player 1 will indicate that player 1 will choose the pure strategy 2 with
probability 1
2
and the pure strategy 4 with probability 1
2
. In the equivalent behavioral
interpretation this boils down to:
"Check with 10, Raise with 30, and with 20:
Check with probability 1
2
and Raise with probability 1
2
".
In analysing the level of skill of this game of Poker we rst need the strategy of a beginner
in both the role of player 1 and player 2.
W.r.t. player 1 we nd it reasonable for a naive player to check with 10 and to raise
with 30. How to act with 20? Probably it is wise to vary between checking and raising,
and using symmetry arguments, to check and raise with equal probability. In fact, the
19
same reasoning applies w.r.t. player 2. If he is called upon to act, we assume he folds
with 10, calls with 30 and folds and calls with equal probability with 20.









The next step is to determine minimaxstrategies for both player 1 and player 2. To this
aim we rst calculate the 8 8 matrix which describes the expected playo to player 1
for each possible pure strategy combination. The result is presented in table 5.3.
player 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
player 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/3 1/3
3 1/3  1/6 1/3  1/6 1/2 0 1/2 0
4 1/3  1/6 1/2 0 2/3 1/6 5/6 1/3
5 2/3 1/6 1/6  1/3 2/3 1/6 1/6  1/3
6 2/3 1/6 1/3  1/6 5/6 1/3 1/2 0
7 1 0 1/2  1/2 7/6 1/6 2/3  1/3
8 1 0 2/3  1/3 4/3 1/3 1 0
Table 5.3: Two-person Mini Poker as a matrix game
More specically, in table 5.3 the result of a specic strategy combination is a fair
average over the outcomes w.r.t. the six possible card combinations.
By iteratively deleting dominated strategies (e.g. strategy 1 of player 1 is dominated by
strategy 2), the 88 matrix game of table 5.3 can be reduced to the simple 22 matrix
game represented in table 5.4.




Table 5.4: The reduced game
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From table 5.4 it is readily derived that the value of the game is 1
18
and the mini-
























indeed guarantees a payo of 1
18
because this strategy leads to an
expected payo of at least 1
18
against every pure strategy of player 2 (see table 5.5) and
hence also against every mixed strategy of player 2.








4/18 1/18 4/18 1/18 7/18 4/18 7/18 4/18
Table 5.5: Payos resulting from the minimax strategy of player 1.








of player 2 guarantees this player
an expected loss of at most 1
18
.
For determining Wl(1);W0(1);Wm(1) and Wu(1) we assume that player 2 behaves ac-

































































To determine Wl(1) and Wu(1), we have to consider a ctitious worst and a ctitious
best player in the role of player 1, respectively.
By assumption, a ctitious worst (best) player will know the precise card combination
(C1;C2), with Ci 2 f10;20; 30g; C1 6= C2, denoting the value of the card of player i,
before having to decide upon checking or raising.








one can calculate for each
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card combination what the expected gains of the two possible actions will be. For each
card combination a ctitious worst (best) player will subsequently choose the action with
minimal (maximal) gains. The numbers Wl(1) and Wu(1) then will be the fair average

















card comb. (10, 20) (10, 30) (20, 10) (20, 30) (30, 10) (30, 20)
Check  1  1 1  1 1 1
Raise 0  2 1  2 1 4
3
Min  1  2 1  2 1 1 Wl(1) =  
1
3





Table 5.6: The calculation of Wl(1) and Wu(1).





















;Wm = 0;Wu =
1
6
and, by substitution, the level of skill equals
S = 0:275:
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Example 5.1 is rather special in the sense that the minimaxstrategies of both player 1
and player 2 are uniquely determined. If this is not the case, the analysis requires a spe-
cic choice between all possible minimax strategies of a player. The minimaxstrategies
we select will be called learnminimax strategies. They have a strong intuitive appeal
because they are the outcomes of (a modication of) learning procedures as initially
proposed by Brown (1949) and Robinson (1950), and elaborated on by Shapiro (1958)
and Karlin (1959).
The following procedure describes how the learnminimaxstrategy q̂ of player 2 is deter-
mined.
Step 1
(a) Let p1 = p1 be the strategy of a beginner in the role of player 1.
(b) Determine the set Y1 of pure strategies of player 2 which are optimal (i.e. best
replies) against p1. Let q1 be the mixed strategy of player 2 that puts equal
probability on the elements of Y1. Dene q1 := q1 as the rst step learn minimax
strategy of player 2.
Step 2
(a) Determine the set X2 of pure strategies of player 1 which are optimal against q1.
Let p2 be the mixed strategy of player 1 that puts equal probability on the elements









, using obvious notation.
(b) Determine the set Y2 of pure strategies of player 2 which are optimal against p2.
Let q2 be the mixed strategy of player 2 that puts equal probability on the elements









as the second step learnminimax strategy of player
2.
Step n
(a) Dene the set Xn of pure strategies of player 1 which are optimal against qn 1. Let
pn be the mixed strategy of player 1 that puts equal probability on the elements













(b) Determine the set Yn of pure strategies of player 2 which are optimal against pn.
Let qn be the mixed strategy of player 2 that puts equal probability on the elements












as the n-th step learnminimax strategy of
player 2.
Denoting the (minimax) value of the underlying game by V and the payo to player 1
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w.r.t. the strategy combination (pn; qn) by Vn, it holds that lim
n!1
Vn = V . (cf. Robinson
(1950)).




In an analogous way, starting out from the strategy of a beginner in the role of player 2,
the learnminimax strategy p̂ of player 1 can be determined.
Example 5.2
Reconsider the game of example 5.1. Suppose however that the game is not played with
3 cards, with values 10, 20 and 30, but with n  4 cards, with values 10, 20, 30; . . . ;10:n
instead. Then, using the concept of learnminimax strategies, the game can be analyzed
along the same lines as in example 5.1.
For n = 4; 5; . . . ; 10 the results are given in table 5.7
n 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20
Table 5.7: The level of skill of two-person Mini-Poker with n cards.
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6 n-Person Zero-Sum Games
For a two-person zero-sum game the players are direct opposites in the sense that the
gains of one player equal the losses of the other in each instance of the game.
Although in each instance of an n-person zero-sum game with n  3 money is reallocated
among the players, two particular participants can not be viewed as direct opposites in
the sense that they should act in a way to oppose each other in the strongest sense. The
mutual competition is of a more indirect and complex nature. Moreover, it is conceivable
that subgroups of players will (possibly implicitly) cooperate during certain stages of the
game to oppose the other participants in a more eective way. Put in game theoretic
terms this means that coalitions (alliances) between players are formed. The situation
is even more complex since coalitions might change during one instance of the game.
Since our aim is to measure the impact of chance elements in a game, we will not analyze
an n-person game in all its strategic and cooperative details. To determine the level of
skill for this type of games in a consistent way we make the assumption that in each
instance of the game player i evaluates the situation as if he faces only one opponent:
the coalition of all other participants which coordinates actions in such a way to oppose
player i in the strongest sense.
These considerations boil down to the following denitions w.r.t. the level of skill of an
arbitrary zero-sum game with player set N = f1; 2; . . . ; ng with n  3.
Assume one is in the role of player i 2 N . By assumption we consider the two-person
zero-sum game between player i and the coalition Nnfig in our analysis of skill. If we
x a specic minimax strategy of "player" Nnfig in this two-person game, a one-person
situation is obtained and the following four basic notions of expected gains of player i
are well-dened:
Wl(i)  W0(i)  Wm(i)  Wu(i) (6.1)
As before, if the minimax strategy of player Nnfig is not uniquely determined, then we
will use the learnminimax strategy of player Nnfig w.r.t. the strategy of a beginner in
the role of player i.

























Wl W0  Wm Wu: (6.3)
As before, we will assume that














as the level of skill.
Note that this denition of the level of skill also can be adopted if n = 2. Obviously,
this renders the same denition as provided in section 5. Finally, the case S = 0 is
equivalent with Wm(i) = W0(i) for all i 2 N , and the case S = 1 with Wm(i) = Wu(i)
for all i 2 N . Therefore, an n-person zero-sum game with S = 0 is called a pure game
of chance while a game with S = 1 is called a pure game of skill.
Example 6.1 (Three-person Mini Poker)
Three-person Mini Poker is a game of cards played by three players 1, 2 and 3 and four
cards with numerical values 10, 20, 30 and 40.
The rules are similar to the rules of two-person Mini Poker. After donating 1$ to the
stakes each player is dealt one card. Player 1 starts the play and has to decide between
checking or raising. If he checks, player 2 and 3 have to check too and showdown follows.
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If he raises, then rst player 2 has to decide between folding or calling, after which player
3 has to make the same choice. If a player raises or calls, he has to add one extra dollar
to the stakes. If both player 2 and 3 fold the stakes go to player 1. Otherwise, showdown
between the two or three players left follows. If showdown ocours, the player with the
highest (value of his) card gets the stakes.
We will not analyze this game in all its details but only highlight some important aspects.
In principle player 1 can choose between 16 = 24 possible (pure) strategies: for each of
his four possible cards he can choose between checking or raising. For the strategy of a
beginner in the role of player 1 we take the pure strategy of Table 6.1.
Card of 1 10 20 30 40
Action C C R R
Table 6.1: Player 1's strategy as a beginner
(C = Check, R = Raise)
Player 2 is only called to play if player 1 raises. In that case he has to decide between
folding or calling. So, in principle, also player 2 can choose between 16 = 24 possible
pure strategies because his decision might depend on his card.
For a beginner in the role of player we take the choices of table 6.2.
Card of 2 10 20 30 40
Action F F C C
Table 6.2: Player 2's strategy as a beginner
(F = Fold, C = Call)
For player 3 the situation is a bit more complicated in the sense that he could let his
choice between folding or calling depend not only on his card but also on the action
taken by player 2. This implies a total of 256 = 28 pure strategies. For a beginner in
the role of player 3 we take the strategy represented in table 6.3.
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Card of 3 10 10 20 20 30 30 40 40
Observed action of 2 F C F C F C F C
Action of 3 F F F F C C C C
Table 6.3: Player 3's strategy as a beginner
(F = Fold, C = Call)
Note that in the game of player 1 against the coalition f2; 3g which we use in our anal-
ysis of skill player 1 can choose between the same 16 pure strategies, while the coalition
f2; 3g can choose between 4696 (=16 . 256) pure strategies. For the corresponding two-
person game it turns out, that the (coordinated) minimax strategy of "player" f2; 3g is
essentially unique and given in Table 6.4 (with obvious notation).
Card of 2 10 20 30 40





Card of 3 10 10 20 20 30 30 40 40
Observed action of 2 F C F C F C F C




C) F or C C C or F
Table 6.4: The minimaxstrategy of coalition f2; 3g.
In this two-person game there is also a unique minimaxstrategy for player 1: see table 6.5.
Card of 1 10 20 30 40





Table 6.5: The minimaxstrategy of player 1.
The value of this game is 1
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. Following a similar analysis as in example 5.1 we nd
Wl(1) =  0:500; W0(1) =  0:125; Wm(1) = 0:041 and Wu(1) = 0:375:
Moreover, proceeding along the same lines and using learnminimaxstrategies (for details
we refer to van der Genugten and Borm (1994))
Wl(2) =  0:573; W0(2) =  0:028; Wm(2) =  0:028; Wu(2) = 0:140
Wl(3) =  0:294; W0(3) =  0:041; Wm(3) =  0:021; Wu(3) = 0:063
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and, consequently
Wl =  0:456; W0 =  0:064; Wm =  0:002 and Wu = 0:193:
Hence, for the level of skill S we nd that
S = 0:35:
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7 A classication of games
In this section we present a global classication of some well-known round games w.r.t.
the level of skill. The corresponding order is partly based on the (objective) analysis
introduced in this paper and partly on a (more subjective) comparison between the var-
ious possibilities of exercising skill in the underlying games.
The main results are summarized in the following overview.
Pure games of chance [0]









Pure games of skill [1]
The ordering between the three variants of Poker is based on the following considerations.
In principle all variants allow a rational player to exercise skill in two ways:
 with knowledge on the statistical probabilities w.r.t. the nal hands of the players,
 with knowledge on a controlled strategy of braging.
In Draw Poker, the second aspect is present in a prominent way but the rst aspect
comes forward only in the relatively simple form of evaluating the possibilities of your
own hand without knowing any other cards. In both Texas Hold'Em and Seven Card
Stud the aspect of braging is less prominent but the rst-mentioned aspect of counting
and estimating probabilities is essential (in Seven Card Stud to a larger extent than in
Texas Hold'Em) to raise one's expected gains.
Interestingly, Dutch jurisprudence has classied Golden Ten as a game of chance while
according to Austrian jurisprudence Schnapsen is a game of skill. If we combine these
judgements, the decision bound between games of chance and games of skill should be
laid between Golden Ten and Schnapsen.
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Of course, the classication given above should not be interpreted as the nal order in
which no shifts are possible. A further analysis, in particular w.r.t. more sophisticated
variants of Poker than the ones discussed in section 5 and 6, is needed to further sharpen
and quantify the classication.
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